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	Sticky	Legacies:		
Persistence	of	State	Constitutional	Provisions	
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Abstract:	 	 In	 this	 paper,	 we	 assess	 the	 evolution	 of	 32	 state	 constitutions	 and	 the	 U.S.	Constitution	over	a	100+	year	time	period	(1776-1907).		We	construct	an	original	section-level	 dataset	 containing	 the	 text	 of	 every	 section	 within	 a	 constitution	 for	 every	 year	between	the	adoption	of	the	state’s	first	constitution	and	1907.	We	classify	each	section	by	topic	 and	 compare	 the	 content	 of	 each	 new	 constitution	 as	 well	 as	 the	 impact	 of	amendments.	 	With	a	subset	of	 these	data,	we	analyze	 the	extent	 to	which	sections	were	added,	 deleted,	modified	 and	 remained	 the	 same	 over	 time	 using	 a	 novel	 approach	 that	relies	 on	 an	 edit	 distance	 measure	 to	 quantify	 the	 similarity	 between	 sections	 of	 two	constitutional	documents.	We	are	also	able	to	empirically	evaluate	the	level	of	similarity	of	modified	 sections	 as	 new	 constitutions	 were	 adopted	 or	 alterations	 were	 made	 to	 an	existing	constitution.	Finally,	we	determine	which	topic	areas	were	subjected	to	the	largest	amount	 of	 change.	 We	 demonstrate	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 systematically	 assess	 a	 large	corpus	 of	 constitutional	 documents	 to	 test	 theories	 of	 institutional	 change,	 provide	empirical	 support	 to	 existing	 qualitative	 accounts,	 and	 create	 operationalizations	 of	concepts	such	as	“stickiness”	that	are	comparable	across	states	and	over	time.							Paper	prepared	 for	presentation	at	 the	Annual	Meeting	of	 the	American	Political	 Science	Association,	Philadelphia,	PA,	September	1-5,	2016.	
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Sticky	Legacies:	Persistence	of	State	Constitutional	Provisions	
	 “Thus,	the	states	remain	significant	determinants	of	the	quality	of	life	of	the	American	people.		The	way	in	which	each	state	frames	and	allocates	powers	through	 its	 constitution	 reflects	 certain	 conceptions	 of	 government	 and	understandings	of	the	two	faces	of	politics	–	power	and	justice.		That	is,	state	constitutions	are	important	determinants	of	who	gets	what,	when	and	how	in	America	because	they	are	conceptual	and	at	 times,	very	specific	statements	of	who	should	get	what,	when	and	how	(Elazar	1982:	17).”	
	
Why	Study	State	Constitutions?			 The	 activities	 of	 state	 governments	 have	 a	 profound	 impact	 on	 the	 quality	 of	 the	lives	of	those	living	within	their	borders.	In	addition	to	establishing	the	basic	structure	of	governance,	these	documents	also	set	the	rules	with	regards	to	citizen	participation	in	the	governing	process;	guarantee	the	rights	and	liberties	of	citizens;	outline	the	functions	and	powers	of	local	governments;	and	in	many	cases,	direct	public	officials	to	enact/implement	specific	public	policies	as	well	as	provide	specific	services	to	citizens.		Thus,	the	impact	of	these	documents	on	our	everyday	lives	is	far-reaching.		 Historically,	state	governments	have	been	front	and	center	in	the	governing	process.		In	the	United	States’	earliest	days,	the	sovereignty	of	the	ability	of	the	states	to	govern	as	they	 saw	 fit	 was	 a	 core	 tenet	 of	 the	 nation’s	 founding.	 	 Today,	 the	 U.S.	 states	 are	 often	characterized	as	“laboratories	of	democracy”	for	their	ability	to	innovate	and	to	formulate	public	 policies	 aimed	 at	 solving	 some	 of	 the	most	 pressing	 public	 policy	 issues.	 	 Elected	officials	 in	 the	 states	 have	 often	 had	 both	 the	 public’s	 support	 and	 willingness	 to	experiment	with	innovative	solutions	to	policy	that	is	absent	at	the	federal	level.	The	policy	areas	 of	 same-sex	marriage,	marijuana	 legalization,	 and	 immigration	 are	 all	 areas	where	states	have	adopted	policies	in	the	face	of	inaction	by	the	federal	government.	 	Of	course,	the	policy	adopted	in	each	area	varies	significantly	across	states	with	the	policies	adopted	reflecting	the	political	culture	and	values	of	the	states’	populations.				 A	 society’s	 constitution	 represents	 a	 fundamental	 statement	 of	 that	 society’s	 core	cultural,	political	and	social	values	at	 the	 time	of	 its	adoption,	and	we	should	expect	 that	these	documents	have	significant	impact	on	how	policy	is	adopted	as	well	as	on	the	content	of	 the	 policy	 adopted.	 	 Donald	 Lutz	 has	 studied	 state	 constitutions	 extensively,	 and	 he	believes	that	a	written	constitution	is	a	“political	technology”	or	“the	very	embodiment	of	the	technology	for	achieving	the	good	life	(Lutz	1982).		Further,	Lutz	argues	eloquently	for	the	need	to	study	the	content	and	effect	of	these	documents:		 “Constitutional	 variables	 do	 not	 matter,	 we	 are	 told,	 because	 political	variables	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 matter.	 	 However,	 studies	 of	 political	 variables	usually	ignore	constitutional	variables.	 	For	instance,	the	presence	of	a	one-party	system	as	opposed	to	a	 two-party	system	is	a	political	variable,	not	a	constitutional	 one.	 	 The	 presence	 of	 a	 unicameral	 versus	 a	 bicameral	
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legislature,	on	the	other	hand	is	a	constitutional	variable.		Herein	lies	part	of	the	 problem.	 Many	 important	 constitutional	 provisions	 do	 not	 vary	 much	from	 state	 to	 state,	 and	 can	 hardly	 be	 used	 to	 explain	 variance	 in	 public	policy.		On	the	other	hand,	the	tendency	for	certain	constitutional	features	to	be	 similar	 over	 most	 states	 must	 itself	 be	 subject	 to	 investigation,	 just	 as	these	similarities	must	be	considered	as	possible	reasons	 for	similarities	or	lack	 of	 diversity	 in	 certain	 types	 of	 public	 policy.	 	 Put	 another	 way,	 these	constitutional	similarities	may	so	structure	the	political	variables	that	public	policy	 will	 tend	 to	 respond	 to	 environmental	 conditions	 in	 a	 differential	manner	simply	because	constitutional	variables	have	already	had	their	effect	by	limiting	the	range	of	possible	policy	outcomes	to	a	relatively	narrow	set	–	a	 set	 of	 possibilities	within	which	 environmental	 factors	 are	 determinative	(Lutz	1982:	28).”		A	handful	of	other	political	 scientists	and	 legal	 scholars	writing	at	 the	same	 time	as	Lutz	argued	 for	 more	 systematic	 study	 of	 state	 constitutions	 (Elazar	 1982;	 Kincaid	 1988,	Friedman	 1988).	 	 For	 the	 most	 part,	 this	 call	 has	 gone	 largely	 unheeded	 by	 political	scientists,	and	legal	scholars	have	chosen	to	focus	more	on	interpretations	and	analysis	of	isolated	provisions	found	in	a	specific	state	constitution	or	on	deep	constitutional	histories	in	single	states.1		 We	believe	that	this	inattention	is	driven	by	a	perception	that	state	constitutions	are	similar	 to	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution	 as	 well	 as	 the	 challenge	 of	 determining	 how	 best	 to	systematically	evaluate	these	documents.	 	In	previous	research,	we	convincingly	illustrate	that	 state	 constitutions	 are	 in	 fact	 very	 different	 from	 the	 federal	 document	 (Martorano	Miller,	 Hamm	 and	 Hedlund	 2009;	 2010;	 2011;	 2014a;	 2014b,	 2015,	 2016),	 and	 in	 this	paper	we	provide	a	systematic	analysis	of	pre-20th	Century	constitutions.	 	Current	events	also	provides	us	with	an	example	of	why	we	should	care	about	the	political	“playing	fields”	that	 state	 constitutional	 documents	 create.	 A	 recent	 session	 of	 the	 Texas	 Legislature	provides	evidence	 to	 this	 claim.	 	Ross	Ramsey,	of	 the	Texas	Tribune	published	a	 story	on	May	27,	2015	titled,	“Analysis:	Votes	Count,	but	the	Rules	Can	Count	More,”	regarding	the	passage	of	 legislation	 in	 the	Texas	 legislative	assembly.	 	The	Texas	Constitution	 contains	some	 very	 specific	 rules	 for	 the	 consideration	 of	 bills	 and	 a	 well-schooled	 member	 or	minority	of	members	can	use	that	knowledge	to	stop	legislation	from	passage.		This	in	fact	occurred	with	bills	and	amendments	regarding	abortion	policy,	same-sex	marriage	policy	and	child	welfare	that	session	(Ramsey	2015a,	2015b).	
	
The	Scope	of	This	Study		
																																																								1	Exceptions	are	Hammons	(1999),	Gardner	(2014)	and	Cayton	(2015)	who	provide	some	very	abstract	quantitative	analysis	of	state	constitutions.	In	the	Oxford	Commentaries	on	the	State	Constitutions	of	the	United	States	series,	each	state’s	constitutional	history	is	given	an	in-depth	book-length	treatment.	
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	 In	this	paper,	we	are	presenting	our	first	attempts	to	leverage	the	power	of	machine	reading	and	analysis	of	state	constitutions	in	order	to	better	describe	and	understand	how	these	documents	have	evolved	over	time.		We	have	chosen	to	focus	on	the	development	of	the	 first	 state	 constitutions	 or	 the	 time	period	 of	 1776-1907.	 	 For	 this	 roughly	 100	 year	time	 period	 we	 have	 collected	 and	 processed	 each	 constitution	 and	 constitutional	amendment	for	thirty-two	states	as	well	as	the	U.S.	Constitution.2		First,	we	will	use	these	data	 to	 illustrate	 some	 basic	 descriptions	 about	 the	 evolution	 of	 state	 constitutions.		Second,	 we	 will	 use	 the	 cases	 of	 Alabama,	 Colorado,	 Illinois,	 Minnesota,	 New	 Jersey,	Wyoming	and	 the	U.S.	Constitution	 to	 illustrate	 the	power	of	approaching	 the	analysis	of	texts	in	this	manner.			 The	 data	 for	 this	 project	 comes	 from	mainly	 two	 sources:	 1)	 the	NBER/Maryland	State	Constitutions	project	(NBER)3	and	2)	Francis	Newton	Thorpe’s,	The	Federal	and	State	
Constitutions,	Colonial	Charters,	and	the	Organic	Laws	of	the	State,	Territories,	and	Colonies;	
Now	or	heretofore	Forming	the	United	States	of	America	(Thorpe)4.	 The	NBER	project	 is	 a	federally	 funded	 project	 that	 created	 a	 searchable	 web-based	 database	 of	 state	constitutions	and	their	amendments.		The	Thorpe	resource	is	a	seven-volume	compendium	of	important	state	documents	that	was	commissioned	by	the	U.S.	Congress	and	published	in	1909.	 	 NBER	 relied	 heavily	 on	 the	 Thorpe	work	 and	 two	 of	 the	 co-authors	 of	 this	 study	crosschecked	both	sources	for	accuracy	as	we	processed	the	data.	 	Appendix	A	contains	a	detailed	discussion	of	how	we	used	the	data	found	in	the	NBER	database5.			 We	also	adopted	the	coding	scheme	of	NBER.		In	this	research	our	unit	of	analysis	is	the	section	level	of	a	constitution.	 	Most	state	constitutions	are	organized	by	Article,	 then	Section	and	subsection.6		The	NBER	 treated	each	 section	of	 a	 constitution	separately	and	coded	each	as	belonging	to	one	of	91	topic	areas7.		We	then	collapsed	those	categories	into																																																									2	These	states	are	Alabama,	California,	Colorado,	Delaware,	Georgia,	Idaho,	Illinois,	Indiana,	Iowa,	Kansas,	Kentucky,	Michigan,	Minnesota,	Mississippi,	Montana,	Nebraska,	Nevada,	New	Jersey,	North	Dakota,	Ohio,	Oklahoma,	Oregon,	Pennsylvania,	Rhode	Island,	South	Carolina,	Tennessee,	Utah,	Virginia,	Washington,	West	Virginia,	Wisconsin	and	Wyoming.		3	http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/index.aspx		4	See	Appendix	A	for	information	on	complimentary	sources	used.			5	Note	that	the	NBER	had	complete	information	for	55	constitutions,	and	complete	amendments	for	45	constitutions.	The	remaining	constitutions	and	amendments	were	coded	by	the	authors	using	the	NBER	coding	scheme.	For	more	details,	see	Appendix	A.			6	For	states	that	were	not	organized	using	the	Article,	Section	format,	we	treated	each	item	as	distinct	section.	Sections	correspond	to	the	smallest	unit	of	analysis	that	divides	a	constitution.	In	some	cases,	clauses	and	subsections	were	used	as	sections.			7	Note	that	the	NBER	had	a	complete	topic	classification	for	55	constitutions.	The	rest	of	the	information	was	coded	by	the	authors	using	the	NBER	topic	coding	scheme.	For	more	details,	see	Appendix	A.	
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seven	broad	topic	areas	 found	 in	most	state	constitutions:	1)	Bill	of	Rights/Minorities,	2)	Constitutional	Amendment	Process,	3)	Suffrage	and	Elections	4)	Finance	and	Taxation,	5)	Policy,	 6)	 Structure	 of	 Government	 and	 7)	 Federal	 Government.	 	We	 excluded	 from	 our	analysis	the	following	types	of	sections:	preambles,	schedules,	certificates	and	ordinances	as	 these	 sections	have	no	direct	 impact	on	 the	processes	of	governance	of	 the	governing	structures	themselves.			 Using	R,	a	software	environment	for	statistical	computing,	we	transformed	the	text	files	of	these	constitutions	into	a	section-level	dataset	where	each	unit	is	a	section	within	a	constitution.	 A	 dataset	 was	 created	 for	 every	 year	 since	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 first	constitution	of	the	state	up	until	1907.	The	datasets	include	the	topic	and	full	text	of	each	section.	If	amendments	were	made	or	a	new	constitution	adopted,	we	replaced	the	text	of	each	 section	with	 the	 text	 that	 resulted	 from	 any	modification.	 If	 sections	were	 deleted,	they	were	dropped	for	the	dataset	of	that	year	and	if	they	were	added,	they	were	included	in	 the	 dataset	 of	 that	 year.	 Our	 final	 datasets	 are	 then	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 way	 each	constitution	looked	as	of	that	particular	year.	This	data	structure	allows	us	to	make	section	level	comparisons	of	a	constitution	in	a	given	point	in	time,	to	that	same	constitution	at	a	later	or	previous	point	in	time,	as	well	as	to	empirically	track	the	evolution	of	each	state’s	constitutional	document(s).		With	these	data	we	are	able	to	assess	change	in	the	aggregate	across	many	states	overtime	as	well	as	explore	that	change	 in	some	detail	within	a	state.	Moreover,	we	are	able	to	compare	the	text	of	every	section	of	a	state’s	constitution	at	point	
t	 to	 the	 text	 at	 point	 tn.	 To	 assess	 the	 similarity	 of	 two	 sections	 and	 after	 properly	processing	and	cleaning	the	text,	we	used	a	modified	normalized	version	of	the	Levenshtein	edit	 distance,	 which	 calculates	 the	 minimum	 number	 of	 insertions,	 deletions	 and	substitutions	of	words	that	would	be	required	to	transform	the	text	in	any	given	section	at	time	t,	to	the	text	of	that	same	section	at	time	tn.	The	score	takes	values	between	0	and	1,	where	1	indicates	maximum	similarity,	and	0	indicates	null	similarity8.			 Using	this	approach,	we	have	traced	the	evolution	of	each	section	of	a	sub-sample	of	states	over	time.	We	will	first	present	data	from	our	thirty-two	state	constitutions	plus	the	U.S.	Constitution	sample	that	provides	a	basic	overview	of	these	documents.		We	will	then	proceed	to	use	our	smaller	six	state	constitutions	plus	U.S.	Constitution	sample	to	illustrate	the	power	of	utilizing	these	techniques	to	leverage	these	text	sources.		
What	do	We	Know	About	State	Constitutions?	
	Regarding	constitutional	politics,	the	U.S.	states	differ	significantly	from	the	national	government.	 Collectively,	 the	 states	 have	 adopted	 145	 constitutions	 since	 the	 nation’s	founding9,	and	the	current	state	constitutions	have	been	amended	over	10,000	times	(Tarr																																																																																																																																																																																				8	See	Appendix	B	for	information	on	the	calculation	of	text	similarity.		9	This	number	is	actually	slightly	higher	if	the	constitutions	of	southern	states	forming	the	Confederacy	during	the	Civil	War	are	included	in	the	tally.		
	 6	
2014).	 	 During	 the	 time	 period	 of	 this	 study	 (1776-1907),	 the	 thirty-two	 states	 and	 the	United	States	adopted	80	constitutions	and	614	amendments	(See	Figure	1).	 	 In	contrast,	the	United	States	has	had	a	single	federal	constitution	that	has	been	amended	only	twenty-seven	 times	 in	 229	 years	with	 twenty-one	 of	 those	 amendments	 occurring	 before	 1908.		Figure	 1	 illustrates	 that	 during	 the	 first	 100	 years,	 the	 states	were	much	more	 able	 and	willing	 to	 modify	 their	 constitutional	 documents	 with	 some	 states	 like	 California,	Minnesota	and	Michigan	choosing	a	path	that	relied	more	on	the	amendment	process	while	most	Southern	states	adopted	five	or	more	constitutions	during	this	period.10		
[Figure	1	about	here]	
	Further,	state	constitutions	on	average	tend	to	be	longer	than	the	U.S.	Constitution	and	are	more	 likely	 to	 contain	explicit	provisions	outlining	 the	 structures	of	government	and	directing	the	state	government	to	adopt	specific	policies	or	provide	specific	services	to	citizens	 (see	 recent	 work	 by	 the	 authors:	 Martorano	 Miller,	 Hamm	 and	 Hedlund	 2009;	2010;	2011;	2014a;	2014b,	2015,	2016).			 Additionally,	 scholars	 such	 as	 Lutz	 (1982)	 and	 Kincaid	 (1988)	 have	 argued	 that	while	 the	 scope	of	 influence	of	 the	national	government	has	expanded	significantly	 since	the	 Nation’s	 founding,	 the	 true	 basis	 of	 governance	 in	 the	 United	 States	 most	 certainly	exists	 in	 the	 individual	 state	 governments.	 	 These	 scholars	 assert	 that	 the	 Framers	intentionally	drafted	the	U.S.	Constitution	as	an	incomplete	document	–	purposely	leaving	to	the	states	all	residual	powers	not	enumerated	in	the	federal	document.		Thus,	it	was	left	to	 the	 states	 to	 “define	 and	 implement	 many	 provisions	 of	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution	 and	structure	the	potentially	vast	domestic	powers	reserved	to	the	states	and	to	the	people	by	the	U.S.	Constitution	 (Kincaid	1988:	12)”	and	 to	 “develop	 the	description	of	 a	way	of	 life	(Lutz	1982:	41)”	in	the	new	formed	nation.	Figure	 1	 also	 provides	 additional	 empirical	 support	 for	 John	 Dinan’s	 (2009)	extensive	 research	 on	 the	 state	 constitutional	 convention	 proceedings.	 He	 convincingly	argues	 and	 provides	 evidence	 that	 reinforces	 the	 contention	 of	 earlier	 scholars	 that	 the	founders	 intended	 the	 states	 to	 “flesh	 out”	 governance	 in	 their	 respective	 constitutional	documents.	In	his	book,	Dinan	(2009)	makes	a	strong	case	for	the	belief	that	the	states	have	been	better	 at	 revisiting	 their	 constitutions	 and	 revising	 their	 institutions	 and	governing	principles	based	on	past	experiences	or	fundamental	shifts	in	culture,	etc.		He	asserts	that	constitutional	 revision	 and	 amendment	processes	 at	 the	 state	 level	 are	 easier	 relative	 to	the	 process	 of	 revising	 or	 amending	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution,	 and	 thus	 have	 allowed	 state	governments	to	evolve	in	ways	that	make	them	more	responsive	to	modern	problems.				State	 constitutions,	 while	 containing	many	 of	 the	 provisions	 found	 in	 the	 federal	document,	 also	 differ	 markedly	 from	 our	 federal	 constitution	 in	 the	 manner	 in	 which	government	structures	and	relative	power	was	originally	perceived.			For	example,	the	U.S.	Constitution	clearly	delineates	 the	Congress’	 legislative	powers	 in	Article	 I,	Section	1	and																																																									10	The	secession	of	these	states	from	the	Union	accounts	for	some	of	these	differences	in	number	of	constitution	adopted	that	exists	between	Southern	and	non-Southern	states.	
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limits	 the	 Congress	 to	 only	 those	 “legislative	 Powers	 herein	 granted.”	 The	 Tenth	Amendment	 further	 limits	 the	 federal	 government	 by	 granting	 the	 states	 the	 power	 not	delegated	to	the	federal	government	or	prohibited	to	the	states.		Given	the	relative	brevity	of	 the	 national	 document,	 this	 granted	 substantial,	 non-delineated	 power	 to	 the	 state	governments.	The	constitutions	adopted	by	the	states	reflected	the	vast	nature	of	what	was	left	unwritten	in	the	federal	Constitution	and	largely	conceived	of	state	government	power	as	 plenary	 and	 granted	 significant	 general	 powers	 to	 the	 legislative	 branch	 in	 particular	(Tarr	1998;	Elazar	1982).		Tarr	explains,			“…state	 governments	 have	 historically	 been	 understood	 to	 possess	 plenary	legislative	 powers	 –	 that	 is,	 those	 residual	 legislative	 powers	 not	 ceded	 to	 the	national	 government	 or	 prohibited	 to	 them	 by	 the	 federal	 Constitution.	 	 As	 the	Kansas	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 observed:	 ‘When	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 a	 statute	 is	involved,	the	question	presented	is,	therefore,	not	whether	the	act	is	authorized	by	the	constitution,	but	whether	it	is	prohibited	thereby	(Tarr	1998:	7).’”		Elazar	 also	 writing	 about	 the	 plenary	 nature	 of	 state	 governments	 explains	 that	 in	comparison	to	the	U.S.	Constitution,	the	state	constitutions	need	to	be	more	comprehensive	and	explicit	about	limiting	and	defining	the	scope	of	governmental	powers	to	prevent	their	growth	and	expansion	(Elazar	1982).	Thus,	these	descriptions	of	state	constitutions	by	Tarr	(1998)	and	Elazar	(1982)	echo	and	support	Lutz’s	perspective	on	the	U.S.	Constitution	as	rather	 “incomplete”	 in	 its	 “dos	and	don’ts”	of	 the	governance	of	 the	United	States	and	 its	citizens.		As	a	result,	the	individual	states	really	have	had	no	choice	but	to	draft	and	adopt	more	detailed	directives	regarding	how	society	would	determine	who	gets	what,	when	and	how	as	well	as	establishing	the	balance	of	power	and	justice	within	that	society.			 State	constitutional	scholars	largely	agree	that	a	constitution	represents	a	peoples’	belief	 of	 how	 their	 society	 should	 operate	 at	 a	 distinct	 point	 in	 time.	 Therefore,	 we	 can	anticipate	 that	 the	 content	of	 these	documents	may	be	heavily	 influenced	by	 the	historic	eras	within	which	they	have	been	adopted.	 	Albert	Sturm	(1982)	identifies	five	periods	of	state	constitutional	development:		 1. The	First	State	Constitutions	(1776-1780)	
• Brief	documents	
• Focused	 on	 outlining	 basic	 government	 structures	 and	 protections	 for	citizens	(e.g.	Bill	of	Rights	type	items)	
• Marked	 by	 establishing	 of	 strong	 legislatures	 with	 significant	 plenary	powers.			2. Early	19th	Century	Developments	(1800-1860)	
• This	period	marked	the	rise	of	Jacksonian	Democracy.			
• Increase	in	suffrage	rights,	but	no	major	provisions	of	a	Bill	of	Rights	nature	
• More	limitations	on	legislative	power	
• Clarifications/further	delineation	of	judicial	power	
• Increase	in	executive	power	
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• Provisions	for	constitutional	amendment	and	revision		 3. Civil	War,	Reconstruction	and	Its	Aftermath	(1860-1900)	
• Significant	impact	on	Southern	states	
• Addition	of	Jim	Crow	provisions	in	Southern	constitutions	
• Provisions	that	authorized	the	government	to	control	and	regulate	economic	activity	
• Increase	in	the	establishment	of	agencies	not	controlled	by	the	executive	
• More	detailed	directives	for	the	legislature,	judiciary	and	executive		 4. Beginnings	of	Reform	(1900-1950)	
• Pressure	to	reform	state	government	after	massive	corruption	uncovered	
• Extension	of	popular	control	of	government	–	rise	of	initiative	and	referenda	
• Influence	of	the	National	Municipal	League’s	Model	State	Constitution	
• Additional	limitations	on	legislatures		5. Constitutional	Modernization	(1950	forward)	
• Revisions	 to	 state	 government	 needed	 to	 meet	 the	 expansion	 of	 state	government	functions		Figure	2	empirically	illustrates	Sturm’s	evolutionary	path	of	state	constitutions.		The	figure	presents	a	 simple	 count	of	 the	number	of	 sections	devoted	 to	 the	 seven	 topics	we	identified	in	the	previous	section.		Given	the	timeframe	of	our	data	we	will	focus	on	the	first	three	eras	identified	by	Sturm.		Sturm	describes	an	evolutionary	path	in	which	the	earliest	state	 constitutional	 documents	 were	 brief	 documents	 that	 outlined	 only	 the	 basic	government	 structures.	 	 Over	 time,	 these	 documents	 become	 more	 complex	 further	delineating	the	structures	of	government	as	well	as	better	defining	the	power	relationships	between	them.		Furthermore,	as	the	need	arose	more	sections	were	added	giving	the	state	government	the	power	to	regulate	finance	and	taxation	as	well	provide	clearer	instructions	regarding	 public	 policy	 responsibilities.	 	 Figure	 2	 clearly	 shows	 that	 between	 1776	 and	1908	 the	 number	 of	 sections	 found	 in	 state	 constitutions	 increased	 at	 a	 steep	 rate	with	increasing	number	of	sections	in	the	areas	of	finance	and	taxation	as	well	as	public	policy	post-1850.		
[Figure	2	about	here]	
		 Figure	2	only	reveals	an	aggregate	picture	of	this	evolution.		Could	it	be	the	case	that	the	 increase	 in	 sections	 is	 simply	an	artifact	of	 additional	 states	 entering	 the	Union	over	time?	 	 Figure	 3	 offers	 two	 bubble	 charts.	 	 The	 first	 is	 a	 bubble	 illustration	 of	 the	 1819	Alabama	 Constitution.	 	 In	 this	 constitution	 there	 were	 just	 four	 topics,	 with	 all	 but	 two	sections	 falling	 into	 either	 the	 structure	 of	 government	 topic	 (76	 sections)	 or	 the	 bill	 of	rights	and	minorities	topic	(39	sections).		One	section	concerned	amending	the	constitution	and	 the	other	policy.	 	The	sections	of	 the	Alabama	Constitution	of	1901	are	spread	more	broadly	across	six	topics,	with	a	significant	increase	in	the	sections	concerning	policy	(from	
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1	 section	 to	 58	 sections),	 suffrage	 and	 elections	 (from	 0	 sections	 to	 26	 sections)	 and	structure	of	government	(from	76	to	138	sections).		
[Figure	3	about	here]			
Stickiness	and	Similarity	in	Constitutions	
	Students	of	institutions	have	often	considered	the	stickiness	of	institutions	–	that	is	once	a	 structure,	 rule,	procedure	or	 informal	norm	has	become	adopted	 it	 is	notoriously	difficult	 to	 repeal,	 change,	 etc.	 	 In	 this	 section,	 we	 will	 explore	 stickiness	 as	 well	 as	 the	notion	of	 similarity.	 	 For	our	purposes,	we	consider	a	 constitutional	 section	as	 sticky	 if	 it	endures	unchanged	over	time	since	its	adoption.		We	are	also	interested	in	the	similarity	of	each	 a	 section	 over	 time	 and	will	 employ	 Levenshtein	 distance	 scores	 to	 determine	 the	extent	 to	 which	 the	 adoption	 of	 new	 constitutions	 and	 amendments	 modified	 existing	sections.		Figure	4	provides	a	series	of	Venn	diagrams	 for	 the	U.S.	Constitution	and	6	states.		The	circle	to	the	left	represents	the	text	of	the	initial	constitutional	document	and	the	circle	to	the	right	represents	the	text	of	the	constitutional	document	as	it	existed	in	1907.11		The	Venn	 diagrams	 simply	 compare	 to	 see	 if	 a	 section	 either:	 1)	 exists	 only	 in	 the	 initial	document	 (deleted),	 2)	 in	 both	 documents	 (remained)	 or	 3)	 only	 in	 1907	 (added).	 	 The	Venn	diagrams	do	not	take	into	account	any	modifications	made	to	sections	that	endured	at	both	 time	periods.	 	The	point	of	Figure	4	 is	merely	 to	 illustrate	 that	 there	appears	 to	be	significant	 variation	 in	 the	 stickiness	 of	 sections	 across	 states.	 	 As	 expected	 the	 U.S.	Constitution	 appears	 very	 sticky	with	 99%	of	 the	 sections	 in	 1787	 remaining	 in	 190712.		Minnesota	 is	similar	with	96%	of	 the	sections	existing	 in	1857	carrying	over	to	1907.	 	 In	contrast,	 only	 47%	 of	 the	 sections	 in	 the	 1819	 Alabama	 Constitution	 still	 existed	 in	 the																																																									11	For	example,	for	the	U.S.	Constitution,	the	left	circle	represents	the	1787	constitution	as	drafted	and	ratified.		The	right	circle	is	the	text	of	the	U.S.	Constitution	with	all	amendments	through	1907	included.		For	Alabama,	the	left	circle	represents	the	1819	Constitution	and	the	right	circle,	the	text	of	the	1901	Alabama	Constitution	with	any	amendments	through	1907.		The	Venn	diagram	does	not	take	into	account	the	1861,	1865,	1868	or	1875	constitutions	and	any	amendments	to	them.		The	Venn	diagrams	simply	compare	the	constitution	at	entry	into	the	United	States	with	the	constitution	at	1907.		12	Note	that	for	the	U.S	constitution	clauses	were	treated	as	sections.	Between	1787	and	1907	Amendments	1	through	10	added	10	sections	on	the	topic	of	Bill	of	Rights,	Amendment	11	added	a	section	on	the	topic	of	Judicial	politics,	and	modified	an	existing	section	(Article	3	Section	2	Clause	1)	on	that	same	topic.	Amendment	12	modified	an	existing	section	(Article	2	Section	1	Clause	3)	on	the	topic	of	the	executive.	Amendment	13	added	a	section	on	slavery	(which	we	treated	as	belonging	to	the	topic	of	Bill	of	Rights	and	minorities).	Amendment	14	added	3	sections	on	citizenship	(treated	as	belonging	to	the	topic	of	Bill	of	Rights	and	minorities),	modified	a	section	(Article	1	Section	2	Clause	3),	and	an	additional	section	was	superseded	by	this	amendment	(Article	2	Section	1	Clause	3),	which	was	treated	as	a	deletion.	Finally,	Amendment	15	added	two	sections	on	citizenship	and	suffrage	respectively.		
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1907	document.	 	 In	Colorado	and	Wyoming	there	were	very	few	deletions	or	additions	 if	any.			 	Of	course,	given	the	time	period	of	this	study,	this	result	is	not	too	surprising	since	Colorado	achieved	statehood	in	1876	and	Wyoming	in	1889	leaving	little	time	to	engage	in	major	constitutional	alterations.		
[Figure	4	about	here]			 Using	 the	 Levenshtein	 distance	 technique	 discussed	 in	 Appendix	 B,	we	 can	 easily	compare	the	text	by	section	of	a	state’s	constitution	at	any	two	points	in	time.13		In	essence,	this	measure	provides	us	with	a	similarity	score	for	each	section	between	two	time-points.	In	this	analysis,	we	are	comparing	the	sections	of	the	first	constitution	with	the	constitution	in	1907.		A	score	of	one	indicates	that	the	section	is	identical	in	1907	as	it	was	in	the	first	constitution.	 	 A	 score	 of	 zero	 indicates	 that	 the	 section	was	 added	 or	 deleted	 sometime	between	the	adoption	of	 the	 first	constitution	and	1907.	 	The	range	of	scores	 in	between	represent	 a	 relative	 similarity	 in	 text	 between	 first	 constitution	 and	 1907.	 	 What	 these	scores	do	not	reveal	is	the	substance	of	these	sections	–	do	they	grant	a	government	power	or	do	they	mandate	or	restrict	government	power?		Our	hope	is	that	in	the	future,	we	will	able	to	combine	this	analytical	technique	with	our	previous	work	on	the	substance	of	these	documents	to	more	efficiently	and	accurately	empirically	analyze	the	substance	and	impact	of	these	changes.			 The	 similarity	 scores	 between	 the	 first	 constitution	 and	 1907	 in	 our	 sub-sample	reveals	that	there	is	quite	a	bit	of	variation	in	the	extent	to	which	the	written	text	of	these	documents	endure	over	time	across	states.		Table	1	provides	a	descriptive	summary	of	the	percentage	 of	 sections	 that	 were	 unchanged,	 modified,	 added	 and	 deleted	 in	 our	 sub-sample.	 	 In	 some	 cases	 (United	 States,	 Colorado,	 Minnesota	 and	 Wyoming),	 a	 large	percentage	 of	 sections	 endured	 unchanged	 from	 the	 first	 constitution	 though	 1907.	 In	others	 (Alabama,	 Illinois	 and	 New	 Jersey)	 very	 few	 sections	 went	 unchanged.	 	 Similar	patterns	 emerge	 for	 modifications,	 additions	 and	 deletions.	 	 	 The	 point	 is	 that	 there	 is	tremendous	variation	across	cases	in	these	behaviors.		
[Table	1	about	here]		 Figure	 5	 presents	 the	 distribution	 of	 similarity	 scores	 for	 six	 states	 and	 the	 U.S.	Constitution.		Each	dot	on	the	plot	represents	a	section.		At	the	very	top	of	each	box-plot	is	a	dark	line	of	dots	(in	blue)	–	these	are	the	sections	that	possess	perfect	similarity	between	the	 first	 document	 and	 1907.	 For	 all	 but	 one	 case,	 there	 are	 quite	 a	 few	 cases	where	 a	section	endures	virtually	unchanged	over	 time.	 	The	one	exception	 is	New	 Jersey,	where	not	 a	 single	 section	 remained	 intact	 between	1776	and	1907.	 	 This	 is	 not	 too	 surprising	since	the	1776	New	Jersey	Constitution	is	more	similar	to	a	colonial	charter	in	its	language	than	the	constitutions	of	most	states	upon	joining	the	United	States.				
[Figure	5	about	here]																																																									13	We	can	also	compare	the	text	by	section	of	the	constitutions	of	two	different	states	as	well,	but	that	is	a	topic	and	analysis	that	we	will	tackle	in	a	future	paper.	
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		 Moving	to	the	other	extreme	in	Figure	5,	are	the	lines	of	dots	(in	green	and	yellow)	running	 along	 the	 bottom	 of	 each	 box-plot.	 	 These	 dots	 represent	 the	 sections	 of	 the	constitution	 that	 have	 been	 added	 or	 deleted	 since	 the	 first	 constitution	 was	 adopted.		Across	our	cases,	it	is	not	surprising	to	find	that	in	most	instances	quite	a	few	sections	have	been	added	or	deleted	to	the	text	as	it	evolved	over	time.		The	one	exception	is	Wyoming,	where	no	new	sections	were	added	nor	any	sections	deleted	between	1889	and	1907.				 Great	 change	 in	 a	 constitutional	 text	 occurs	 through	 the	 modification	 of	 existing	sections.	 	Over	time,	structures	become	more	delineated	and	citizens	may	decide	that	the	government	needs	to	be	mandated	to	act	on	its	behalf	or	limited	in	its	action.		The	middle	section	of	dots	 (in	 red)	 in	each	box-plot	 represents	 the	sections	 that	have	been	modified	between	 the	 first	 constitution	 and	 1907.	 	 As	 is	 evident,	 there	 is	 quite	 a	 wide	 range	 of	modification	occurring	in	these	sections.	 	In	some	cases,	the	modification	to	the	section	is	relatively	 minor	 with	 similarity	 score	 greater	 than	 .75.	 	 In	 others	 the	 modification	 is	extreme	with	a	similarity	score	less	than	.25.		In	Alabama,	Colorado,	Illinois,	and	Minnesota	there	is	extensive	variation	in	similarity	scores	across	modified	sections.		The	dark	red	line	within	the	box	plot	is	the	median	similarity	score.		The	fact	that	there	is	a	great	amount	of	distance	 between	 the	 median	 and	 the	 upper	 and	 lower	 quartiles	 as	 well	 as	 fairly	 long	whiskers	 to	 the	 minimum	 and	 maximum	 similarity	 scores	 indicate	 there	 is	 substantial	variation	ripe	for	future	analysis.				 A	different	pattern	of	modification	emerges	in	each	of	the	three	remaining	cases.		In	New	Jersey,	 the	box-plot	reveals	that	modified	sections	of	 its	constitution	in	1907	exhibit	little	similarity	to	the	text	of	the	sections	adopted	in	1776	with	a	median	similarity	score	of	less	than	.25	and	a	very	squat	quartile	box	with	tiny	whiskers.	 	Only	3	sections	of	the	U.S.	Constitution	were	modified	with	two	of	the	modified	sections	possessing	similarity	score	of	less	 than	 .5	 and	 one	with	 a	 score	 in	 excess	 of	 .75.	 	 Finally,	 in	Wyoming	 there	was	 not	 a	single	section	modified	between	1889	and	1907.			 We	 have	 also	 produced	 this	 same	 set	 of	 box-plot	 breaking	 the	 sections	 out	 by	constitutional	 topic.	 	These	are	presented	 in	Figure	6.	What	 this	 figure	 shows	 is	 that	 the	sections	that	were	modified	dealt	largely	with	government	structure	and	bill	of	rights	and	minorities	 sections.	 	 While	 there	 were	 some	 modifications	 to	 sections	 dealing	 with	 the	other	 topics,	 the	 change	 between	 1776	 and	 1907	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 finance	 and	 taxation,	policy	and	suffrage	and	elections	was	due	more	to	the	addition	of	new	sections	(see	lower	left	 box	 of	 Figure	6)	 than	 changes	 in	 existing	 sections.	 	 The	patterns	 of	 section	 addition,	deletion	and	modification	exhibited	in	the	table	further	support	Sturm’s	(1982)	account	of	the	eras	of	state	constitutional	development.		
[Figure	6	about	here]			 In	this	section	we	have	effectively	illustrated	that	there	seems	to	be	some	evidence	that	 constitutional	 provisions	 are	 somewhat	 sticky	 –	 once	 included	 in	 a	 document,	 it	 is	likely	 that	 they	will	 remain.	 	However,	we	have	also	 shown,	 especially	 in	 the	 states,	 that	
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modifications	 of	 these	 provisions	will	 occur.	 	What	we	 cannot	 illustrate	 in	 this	 paper	 is	whether	 or	 not	 these	 modifications	 resulted	 in	 significant	 substantive	 changes	 in	 these	sections.		Tackling	that	question	will	be	the	focus	of	a	future	paper.		 	
Constitutional	Change	Over	Time	and		
The	Choice	to	Amend	or	Adopt	New	Documents	
	Many	 scholars	 have	 asserted	 that	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 political	 institutions	 and	processes	 evolve	 are	 by	 their	 nature	 path	 dependent.	 	 That	 is	 the	 initial	 choices	 and	decisions	made	regarding	those	 institutions	and	process	start	a	 trajectory	 in	which	those	early	 choices	 influence	 all	 future	 decision-making	 and	 changes	 in	 those	 institutions	 and	processes.	 	 Thus,	 any	 attempt	 to	 account	 for	 institutional	 evolution	must	 take	 this	 path	dependency	into	account	(Pierson	2000a,	2000b;	Jervis	2000;	Thelen	2000;	Bridges	2000).		Comparative	 politics	 scholars	 studying	 democratization	 and	 the	 adoption	 of	 other	governing	 institutions	 as	well	 as	 scholars	 studying	American	 political	 development	 have	long	 acknowledged	 the	 importance	 of	 path	 dependency	 in	 their	 work	 (e.g.,	 Lipset	 and	Rokkan	1967;	North	1990;	Schickler	2001;	Skocpol	1992;	Collier	and	Collier	1991;	Ertman	1996;	Hacker	1998).	 	These	same	authors	assert	that	events	–	both	small	and	large	–	that	occur	 as	 the	 path	 is	 travelled	 create	 “forks”	 in	 the	 road	 that	 may	 lead	 to	 different	institutional	changes	and	evolution	depending	on	the	turn	taken.			 In	this	section	we	will	discuss	how	initial	procedures	for	changing	a	constitutional	document	may	influence	how	a	document	is	altered	over	time.		Figure	7	is	a	box-plot	of	U.S.	Constitutional	 change	over	 the	 time	period	of	 study.	 	The	U.S.	has	only	ever	had	a	 single	constitution	and	as	is	evident	from	the	plot	during	its	first	roughly	100	years	was	modified	only	minimally	mostly	through	the	addition	of	a	handful	of	amendments.	 	Since	the	initial	constitutional	convention,	 there	have	been	no	successful	attempts	 to	call	a	convention	 to	propose	 amendments	 to	 the	 constitution	 nor	 have	 most	 of	 the	 over	 10,000	 proposed	amendments	successfully	navigated	the	amendment	process.		
[Figure	7	about	here]	
	
	 The	 state	 of	 Alabama	 provides	 a	 stark	 contrast	 to	 our	 national	 constitutional	experience.		Between	1819	and	1901,	Alabama	adopted	six	separate	constitutions.		Figure	8	displays	a	box-plot	of	 the	similarity	scores	tracking	constitutional	change	over	time.	 	The	box	plots	in	the	gray	(shaded)	areas	represent	the	distribution	of	similarity	scores	when	we	compare	 the	 text	 of	 a	 new	 a	 constitution	 to	 the	 text	 of	 that	 constitution	 in	 the	 year	 just	prior	to	the	adoption	of	a	new	constitution.		The	box-plots	in	the	unshaded	areas	represent	a	comparison	of	the	text	of	the	old	constitution	in	its	last	year	of	existence	to	the	text	of	the	new	 constitution	 that	 succeeded	 it.	We	wanted	 to	make	 this	 distinction	 to	 separate	 the	changes	that	occur	during	the	amendment	process	that	takes	place	between	the	adoption	of	 two	 constitutions,	 from	 those	 that	 take	 place	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 new	constitution.	For	example,	Alabama	adopted	its	first	constitution	in	1819	and	its	second	in	1861	when	it	seceded	from	the	United	States	at	the	start	of	the	Civil	War.		The	first	box-plot	
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in	the	gray	area	conveys	the	similarity	of	the	sections	of	the	1819	constitution	as	adopted,	to	what	the	text	read	in	1860	after	it	had	been	amended	several	times	over	41	years.		The	second	box-plot	in	the	white	area	compares	the	sections	of	the	1819	Constitution	as	it	read	in	1860	to	the	text	of	the	new	Constitution	adopted	in	1861.		
[Figure	8	about	here]			 In	Alabama,	despite	provisions	in	each	of	the	six	constitutions	that	provided	for	the	amending	of	the	existing	document,	it	is	clear	major	constitutional	changes	were	reserved	for	 when	 new	 documents	 were	 adopted.	 	 In	 fact,	 prior	 to	 1907,	 the	 only	 Alabama	constitution	 that	 was	 ever	 amended	 was	 the	 1819	 Constitution.	 	 Recall	 the	 earlier	discussion	of	path	dependency	and	the	impact	of	small	vs.	large	events.		Alabama’s	decision	to	 rely	 on	 the	 adoption	 of	 new	documents	 to	 alter	 its	 constitution	 is	 likely	 driven	 by	 its	location	in	the	deep-South.			 The	experience	of	the	Southern	states	during	the	Civil	War	and	Reconstruction	era	illustrates	 this	 point	 beautifully.	 	 Prior	 to	 their	 secession	 from	 the	 Union	 each	 of	 these	states	had	adopted	constitutions	that	were	similar	to	those	found	in	the	Northern	states	–	save	 provisions	 that	 furthered	 and	 protected	 the	 institution	 of	 slavery.	 	 Somewhat	interestingly,	 these	 states	 did	 little	 to	 alter	 their	 constitution	 as	 they	 created	 the	Confederate	States	of	America	(CSA)	–	most	of	the	states	simply	just	amended	their	existing	documents	 by	 changing	 United	 States	 of	 America	 to	 Confederate	 States	 of	 America	 and	adopted	provisions	 that	 further	entrenched	and	protected	 the	 institution	of	 slavery.	 	The	significant	changes	did	not	occur	until	after	the	war	was	lost	and	the	CSA	was	no	more.		The	price	 of	 reentering	 the	 Union	 was	 the	 drafting	 and	 establishment	 of	 a	 new	 state	constitution	 that	 met	 the	 specific	 conditions	 set	 by	 the	 federal	 government	 for	 reentry.		Once	 the	 federal	 government	 returned	 governance	 to	 the	 defeated	 Southerners,	 they	adopted	 another	 set	 of	 constitutions	 that	 institutionalized	 Jim	 Crow	 laws	 aimed	diminishing	the	civil	and	political	rights	of	African-Americans.		Figure	1	clearly	showed	that	the	Southern	states	in	our	study	had	adopted	significantly	more	new	constitutions	versus	states	in	other	regions.		This	is	due	in	large	part	to	the	Civil	War	experience.		Three	distinct	constitutions	were	adopted	by	Southern	states	during	this	period	in	history:	1)	Confederate	States	of	America	(Civil	War)	constitution;	2)	Reconstruction	constitution	(needed	for	re-admittance	to	the	United	States)	and	3)	redeemer	constitutions	(reestablishment	of	the	old	order	once	reconstruction	ended).		Thus,	in	this	case	a	large	event	–	the	Civil	War	–	created	a	 “fork	 in	 the	 road”	 that	 caused	 these	 states	 to	 choose	 the	 patch	 of	 adopting	 new	constitutions	versus	amending	an	existing	one.		Additionally,	 the	events	of	 the	Civil	War	 created	 conditions	 that	 led	 to	 substantial	change	 in	 these	documents.	 	Let’s	return	to	our	Alabama	example.	 	Figure	9	uses	median	similarity	scores	to	illustrate	the	impact	of	the	adoption	of	a	new	constitution.		In	this	case	we	are	plotting	the	median	similarity	score	in	the	constitution	for	the	time	period	of	1819-1907.	We	are	comparing	the	sections	of	a	document	in	a	given	year,	to	the	sections	of	the	document	the	following	year.	The	line	remains	flat	at	one	(perfect	matching	of	sections)	for	most	 years.	 The	 exceptions	 are	 1865	 and	 1868	 (Reconstruction	 constitutions),	 1875	(redeemer	 constitution)	 and	 1901	 where	 the	 median	 similarity	 score	 was	 less	 than	 .5	
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indicating	 that	 the	 sections	 that	were	modified	exhibited	a	 low	degree	of	 similarity	 from	their	 previous	 version.	 	 In	 fact,	 the	 median	 similarity	 score	 for	 the	 1875	 redeemer	constitution	is	zero	indicating	that	many	sections	were	deleted	entirely	and/or	completely	new	sections	were	added.		The	only	time	a	new	constitution	was	adopted	in	Alabama	and	the	median	similarity	score	remained	at	one	was	when	the	1861	Civil	War	constitution	was	adopted.	 	 Histories	 of	 the	 Alabama	 constitution	 indicate	 that	 the	 state	 made	 minimal	changes	to	the	document	upon	secession	(Winkle	2014).				
[Figure	9	about	here]		This	notion	 that	a	 large	event	 can	 lead	 to	 significant	 change	also	echoes	 the	work	Baumgartner	 and	 Jones	 (1993)	 who	 developed	 a	 theory	 of	 punctuated	 equilibrium	 to	explain	policy	change.		In	their	work	they	show	that	policy	does	not	change	incrementally.		Rather,	policy	is	stable	for	a	long	period	of	time	and	then	an	event	occurs	that	causes	the	public	 and	 elected	 officials	 to	 call	 for	 policy	 change	 that	 leads	 to	 significant	 policy	alteration,	which	then	leads	into	another	extended	period	of	stability.		This	brief	analysis	of	the	case	of	Alabama	provides	some	evidence	that	punctuated	equilibrium	may	have	some	ability	to	account	for	constitutional	change	under	certain	historical	conditions.	
	
Discussion			 The	 description	 of	 the	 historical	 evolution	 of	 state	 constitutions	 in	 this	 paper	represents	in	many	ways	the	view	from	50,000	feet.	 	The	most	general	conclusion	we	can	draw	is	that	at	the	state	level	there	was	tremendous	change	in	constitutions	between	1776	and	 1907.	 	 Specifically,	 we	 have	 also	 shown	 that	 number	 of	 sections	 increased	 and	 the	topics	 addressed	 in	 a	 constitution	 increased	 over	 time	 and	 are	 correlated	with	 the	 time	period	of	the	adoption	of	the	constitution.		In	general,	as	time	passes,	constitutions	become	more	complex	–	the	document	contains	more	provisions	over	a	wider	range	of	topics.			 We	also,	 in	 very	 general	 terms,	were	 able	 to	 address	 the	notions	of	 stickiness	and	
similarity.	 	 	 Once	 a	 section	 is	 included	 in	 a	 constitution,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 it	 will	 remain	(stickiness).	 	 However,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 wide	 range	 in	 variance	 regarding	 the	similarity	 of	 the	 text	 of	 these	 sections	 over	 time	 in	 some	 states,	 and	 at	 this	 time	we	 are	unable	to	determine	the	true	impact	of	the	modifications	revealed	by	the	similarity	scores.		In	 future	 research	 we	 intend	 to	 dig	 deeper	 into	 the	 tension	 between	 stickiness	 and	similarity	within	sections	of	a	constitution	over	time.				 The	other	contribution	of	this	paper	is	the	technique	that	we	have	used	to	analyze	and	 compare	 the	 constitutions	 in	 our	 sample.	 	 The	 techniques	 employed	 here	 have	provided	leverage	over	the	data	we	had	been	unable	to	previously	achieve.		Human	reading	and	coding	of	 these	texts	 is	 time	consuming.	 	The	use	of	machine-reading	and	automated	text	analytics	have	allowed	us	to	be	able	to	compare	over	350,000	sections	of	constitutions	over	 a	 100-year	 period.	 	 Our	 hope	 is	 that	 we	 will	 be	 able	 to	 further	 develop	 these	techniques	to	tackle	the	coding	of	constitutional	content	 in	the	future.	At	a	minimum,	the	similarity	score	makes	the	analysis	of	change	more	efficient	and	less	resource	demanding	
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by	helping	us	quickly	identify	which	sections	have	changed	so	that	we	can	later	assess	the	depth	and	meaning	of	that	change.		 In	a	future	analysis	of	state	constitutions,	we	plan	to	tackle	the	question	of	content.		What	do	these	documents	say	specifically	regarding	governance	in	a	state?		Past	research	we	have	conducted	reveals	that	the	provisions	found	in	state	constitutions	restrict,	exclude,	mandate	or	empower	structures	such	as	the	legislature.		What	is	the	balance	between	these	types	of	provisions	within	states	overtime	as	well	as	across	states	in	different	eras?		What	does	this	mean	for	policy-making	and	the	content	of	that	policy?			Additionally,	 to	what	 extent	 do	 states	 learn	 and/or	 borrow	 from	 one	 another?	 In	this	analysis	we	clearly	show	that	states	that	entered	the	United	States	later	in	the	period	of	study	began	statehood	with	more	complex	constitutions	–	more	provisions	in	more	areas.		How	much	of	what	 exists	 in	one	 state’s	 constitution	 can	be	 found	 in	 the	 constitutions	of	other	states?		It	is	likely	that	as	states	entered	the	Union	or	chose	to	engage	in	whole	scale	revision	of	an	existing	constitution,	that	they	consulted	the	constitutions	of	other	states	in	an	attempt	to	identify	the	best	practices	of	the	day.		Squire	(2012),	in	his	historical	study	of	the	 evolution	 of	 American	 legislatures	 provides	 extensive	 evidence	 that	 states	 modeled	their	 legislatures	 on	 already	 existing	 legislatures.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 particular	provisions	experience	a	diffusion	into	the	states	over	time.	With	more	elaborated	measures	of	text	similarity	that	allow	us	to	compare,	not	 just	the	literal,	but	the	semantic	similarity	between	 two	 texts,	which	are	currently	being	developed	 in	 the	 field	of	Natural	Language	Processing,	we	can	begin	to	tackle	questions	of	diffusion	on	larger	scales	than	ever	before.	
	
	 Finally,	the	approach	and	methods	we	have	used	in	this	paper	can	easily	be	used	to	study	 other	 phenomena	 in	 the	 states.	 For	 example,	 our	method	 of	machine	 reading	 and	comparing	a	state’s	constitution	over	time	as	well	as	constitutions	across	states	can	easily	be	 translated	 to	 studies	 of	 public	 policies,	 the	 development	 of	 legislation	 or	 a	 state’s	statutory	code.		 	
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APPENDIX	A	To	 conduct	 a	 quantitative	 analysis	 of	 state	 constitutions	 the	 texts	 of	 the	constitutions	must	 be	 in	 a	 readable	 format	 (.txt)	 for	 processing,	 and	we	must	 be	 able	 to	easily	 search	 and	 capture	 fragments	 of	 the	 text	 (such	 as	 articles	 or	 sections)	 to	 conduct	targeted	 comparisons.	 The	 NBER/Maryland	 State	 Constitutions	 project	 website	 has	 a	public	repository	of	constitutions	saved	in	 .txt	 format.	Additionally,	 the	coding	rules	used	by	the	NBER	project	allow	us	to	retrieve	items	within	a	constitution	in	an	automated	way.	Each	 of	 the	 constitutions	 in	 the	 repository	 has	 been	 coded	 using	 the	 same	 scheme.	 Our	initial	analysis	was	conducted	using	80	constitutions	between	1776	and	1907.	Out	of	these	80,	NBER	had	complete	information	on	55	constitutions,	and	had	recorded	amendments	for	45	 of	 these.	 The	missing	 constitutions	 include:	 California	 1849,	 California	 1879,	 Georgia	1777,	 Georgia	 1789,	 Georgia	 1798,	 Georgia	 1861,	 Georgia	 1865,	 Georgia	 1868,	 Georgia	1877,	 Iowa	 1844,	 Nebraska	 1866,	 Nebraska	 1875,	 New	 Jersey	 1776,	 New	 Jersey	 1844,	Oregon	1857,	Tennessee	1796,	Tennessee	1835,	Tennessee	1870,	Virginia	1776,	Virginia	1830,	Virginia	1851,	Virginia	1869,	Virginia	1902,	Wisconsin	1848,	United	States	1787.		These	 missing	 constitutions	 were	 coded	 by	 the	 authors.	 Amendments	 were	 also	coded	by	the	authors	for	these	constitutions	as	well	as	for	the	constitutions	of	Alabama	and	Delaware,	 which	 were	 not	 completed	 by	 the	 NBER.	 These	 missing	 constitutions	 and	amendments	were	mostly	retrieved	from	Francis	Newton	Thorpe’s,	The	Federal	and	State	Constitutions,	 Colonial	 Charters,	 and	 the	 Organic	 Laws	 of	 the	 State,	 Territories,	 and	Colonies;	 Now	 or	 heretofore	 Forming	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America	 (Thorpe).	 The	 scans	from	the	volumes	were	converted	into	.txt	format	using	ABBYY,	an	OCR	and	text	scanning	software.	After	the	constitutions	were	converted	into	.txt	format	they	were	coded	following	NBER	 coding	 rules.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 NBER	 texts	 were	 all	 revised	 and	 cross	checked	 by	 the	 authors	 also	 using	 Thorpe.	 In	 some	 cases,	 complimentary	 sources	 were	used.	 These	 include	 the	 Delaware	 Journal	 of	 Corporate	 Law14,	 the	 GeorgiaInfo	 online	almanac15,	Acts	and	Resolutions	of	the	General	Assembly	of	the	State	of	Georgia	for	various	years16,	the	Code	of	the	State	of	Georgia	by	Howard	Van	Epps	189517,	documents	from	the	TNGenWeb	 Project18,	 	 documents	 from	 the	 For	 Virginians:	 Government	Matters	website																																																									14	http://www.djcl.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/A-History-of-Delaware-Corporation-Law1.pdf	15	http://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/topics/government/related_article/constitutions/georgia-constitution-of-1861	16	https://play.google.com/store/books/details/Acts_and_Resolutions_of_the_General_Assembly_of_th?id=deYXAAAAYAAJ	,	https://books.google.com/books?id=-RI4AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA19&dq=georgia+acts+and+resolutions+1890+1891&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjVgtfJzKHOAhVISCYKHSawBigQ6AEIRzAH#v=onepage&q=georgia%20acts%20and%20resolutions%201890%201891&f=false		17	http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/ga_code/25/	18	http://tngenweb.org/law/		
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owned	by	The	Center	 for	History	 and	New	Media	 (CHNM)	 at	George	Mason	University19	and	information	from	the	constitutionsus	website20.		Once	these	text	were	in	readable	.txt	format	we	used	R	to	transform	the	text	files	of	these	 constitutions	 into	 a	 section-level	 dataset	 where	 each	 unit	 is	 a	 section	 within	 a	constitution.	 A	 dataset	 was	 created	 for	 every	 year	 since	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 first	constitution	of	the	state	up	until	1907.	The	datasets	include	the	topic	and	full	text	of	each	section.	If	amendments	were	made	or	a	new	constitution	adopted,	we	replaced	the	text	of	each	 section	with	 the	 text	 that	 resulted	 from	 any	modification.	 If	 sections	were	 deleted,	they	were	dropped	for	the	dataset	of	that	year	and	if	they	were	added,	they	were	included	in	the	dataset	of	that	year.	Our	final	datasets	consist	of	the	sections	of	each	constitution	for	the	32	states	and	the	U.S.	as	of	each	year	between	the	first	constitution	and	1907.			
	 	
																																																								19	http://vagovernmentmatters.org/primary-sources/518	20	http://constitutionus.com/	
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APPENDIX	B	Before	we	were	able	 to	 compare	 sections	of	 two	constitutions	 the	 text	of	 sections	needed	to	be	pre-processed,	cleaned	and	decoded	to	get	an	accurate	similarity	assessment.	First	we	decoded	the	data	so	that	all	of	it	would	be	in	a	standard	encoding	format.	In	this	case	UTF-8,	which	is	widely	accepted	and	recommended	format.		Second,	we	removed	stop-words,	or	commonly	occurring	words	in	the	English	language	using	the	tm	package21.	We	did	not	remove	stop	words	that,	although	common	in	the	English	language	we	considered	to	 be	 reflective	 of	 substantive	 change	 such	 as	 “may”	 and	 “shall”.	 Third,	 we	 removed	punctuation	 marks	 and	 other	 non-character	 symbols.	 	 Finally,	 we	 standardized	 words,	replacing	words	that	used	the	British	spelling	(i.e.	“Defence”),	with	the	American	spelling	so	that	words	that	had	the	same	meaning	but	a	different	spelling	would	not	drive	down	the	similarity	score.	We	used	a	variety	of	sources	on	the	web	to	get	a	list	of	such	words22.		After	 the	 sections	 texts	had	been	processed	we	proceeded	 to	assess	 the	 similarity	between	 sections	 of	 constitutions.	 For	 this	 purpose,	 we	 used	 a	 modified	 version	 of	 the	Levenshtein	edit	distance.	The	original	Levenshtein	algorithm	calculates	the	least	number	of	edit	operations	(deletions,	insertions	and	substitutions)	that	are	necessary	to	modify	one	string	 to	 obtain	 another	 string.	 	 The	 algorithm	 assigns	 a	 value	 of	 1	 to	 each	 character	insertion,	deletion	and	substitution.	The	normalized	version	of	the	algorithm	then	divides	this	minimum	number	of	insertions,	deletions	and	substitutions	by	the	length	of	the	longer	string	 and	 subtracts	 the	 resulting	 value	 from	1.	 The	Levenshtein	measure	was	 originally	created	 to	 compare	 characters	 in	words,	 instead	 of	 sentences,	where	 a	 small	 number	 of	differences	is	to	be	expected,	and	is	typically	used	by	spell	checker	and	correction	systems.	Since	 we	 were	 interested	 in	 comparing	 words	 within	 sentences,	 instead	 of	 characters	within	words	we	adapted	the	algorithm	to	use	words	instead	of	characters	to	calculate	the	distance	 and	 used	 the	 standard	 dynamic	 programming	 approach	 for	 computing	 the	Levenshtein	distance	with	these	modifications.	We	then	divided	that	distance	by	the	length	(amount	of	words)	of	 the	 longer	sentence	and	subtracted	the	resulting	value	 form	1.	The	values	 of	 the	modified	 Levenshtein	 distance	 range	 from	 0	 to	 1,	 with	 1	 denoting	 perfect	similarity	and	0	denoting	the	lowest	degree	of	similarity.	In	 the	 case	 of	 amendments	 knowing	 which	 sections	 to	 compare	 with	 another	 was	straightforward,	 since	 they	 shared	 a	 common	 article,	 section	 and	 subsection	 (when	applicable)	number,	 so	sections	with	 the	same	 identifiers	 (article,	 section	and	subsection	numbers)	were	compared.	In	the	case	of	the	adoption	of	new	constitutions	this	is	harder	to	assess	 since	 sections	 might	 no	 longer	 share	 the	 same	 identifiers	 as	 constitutions	 get	renumbered	and	reorganized.	To	solve	this	problem,	we	compared	every	possible	section	of	a	given	topic	in	the	first	document	with	every	possible	section	of	that	same	topic	in	the																																																									21	See	the	documentation	of	the	package	for	a	full	list	of	stop	words	https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/tm/tm.pdf		22	See	for	example	http://www.tysto.com/uk-us-spelling-list.html		
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second	document.	The	 result	 is	 a	matrix	 of	 similarity	 scores	between	 the	 sections	of	 the	same	 topic.	We	 then	 calculated	 the	maximum	 similarity	 score	 for	 each	 section,	 working	under	 the	 assumption	 that	 this	would	 increase	 the	 probability	 that	 a	 section	 in	 the	 first	document	 would	 be	 matched	 with	 its	 true	 equivalent	 in	 the	 second	 document.	 We	proceeded	to	do	a	visual	check	of	matches,	to	ensure	that	each	section	was	matched	with	an	equivalent	section	in	the	second	constitution.	We	found	that	the	algorithm	was	producing	a	correct	 match	 whenever	 the	 similarity	 score	 was	 above	 .25.	 Typically,	 scores	 of	 the	Levenshtein	rarely	fall	to	zero	since	some	common	words	between	sentences,	for	example,	the	word	“legislator”	all	always	present	when	you	are	comparing	sections	that	share	topic.	What	we	want	is	for	added	or	deleted	sections	to	be	compared	to	a	blank	space	so	that	the	Levenshtein	distance	will	take	a	value	of	zero.	We	made	sure	to	revise	every	case,	ensuring	that	 sections	 that	 were	 deleted	 from	 the	 first	 document,	 or	 added	 from	 the	 second	document,	were	not	matched	with	another	section,	and	that	each	section	was	matched	with	its	true	equivalent.	After	this	process	we	recalculated	the	similarity	score.		One	of	our	concerns	when	using	the	Levenshtein	measure	to	calculate	similarity	section	by	 section	 is	 that	 sections	 vary	 a	 great	 deal	 in	 the	 amount	 of	 words	 they	 contain,	 and	constitutions	 vary	 in	 the	 average	 number	 of	 words	 they	 include	 in	 each	 section.	 If	 the	distance	 is	 sensitive	 to	 the	 number	 of	words,	meaning	 sections	with	 a	 lower	 number	 of	words	will	have	lower	similarity	scores,	comparisons	across	sections	and	states	would	not	be	accurate.	To	assess	whether	such	bias	exists	we	plotted	the	similarity	scores	per	pair	of	section	 over	 the	 total	 number	 of	 words	 in	 each	 section	 for	 all	 of	 our	 constitution	combinations	 and	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 no	 bias.	 Similarity	 scores	 are	 distributed	with	 no	discernable	pattern	across	different	values	of	the	logged	number	of	words	per	section.	Finally,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 some	 of	 the	 limitations	 of	 this	 approach	 to	 compare	similarity	 of	 sections.	 The	 methods	 we	 have	 discussed	 to	 classify	 and	 measure	 the	similarity	 of	 texts	 are	 part	 of	 what	 is	 known	 as	 a	 statistical	 approach	 to	 Information	Retrieval.	From	a	statistical	approach,	documents	can	be	described	by	a	representative	set	of	 keywords	 (BaezaYates	 and	Ribeiro-Neto	 1999)23.	 	 A	 problem	of	 this	 approach,	 versus	what	 is	 known	 as	 a	 natural	 language	 approach,	 	 is	 word	 sense	 ambiguity,	 or	 “The	Vocabulary	Problem”	(Furnas	et	al.	1987)24,	which	refers	to	situations	in	which	reformers	of	one	constitution	do	not	use	exactly	the	same	words	as	reformers	of	another	constitution,	even	 though	 the	 intention	 of	 both	 groups	 of	 reformers	 is	 the	 same.	 They	 might	 use	synonyms	or	equivalent	phrases.	Another	side	of	 this	problem	 is	when	 two	constitutions	use	the	same	terms,	so	both	documents	include	the	same	search	terms,	but	they	are	used	with	different	intentions,	or	in	another	sense.																																																										23	Baeza-Yates	and	Ribeiro-Neto.	1999.	Modern	Information	Retrieval.	http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hearst/irbook/print/chap10.pdf			24	Furnas,	G.	W.,	Landauer,	T.	K.,	Gomez,	L.	M.,	&	Dumais,	S.	T.	1987.	The	vocabulary	problem	in	human-system	communications.	Communications	of	the	ACM,	30.	s	
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Natural	 language	 texts	 contain	 sentences	 that	 have	 a	 grammatical	 structure	 and	 use	vocabulary	rich	in	synonyms.	These	elements	contribute	to	a	textís	meaning,	which	is	not	considered	 in	 statistical	 information	 retrieval.	 Automated	 information	 retrieval	 with	 a	statistical	approach	will	always	face	these	types	of	limitations,	which	is	why	they	might	not	achieve	human	levels	of	performance,	and	are	likely	to	identify	some	degree	of	erroneous	information,	or	ignore	relevant	information.		Because	we	are	analyzing	constitutions	within	the	same	state	and	within	a	limited	time	period	 we	 considered	 and	 were	 able	 to	 determine	 through	 visual	 checks	 that	 the	vocabulary	 problem	 was	 not	 giving	 bias	 to	 our	 results.	 However,	 moving	 forward	 into	comparisons	within	longer	time	frames	and	comparison	of	the	texts	of	different	states	this	problem	needs	 to	 be	 addressed.	 One	way	 of	 proceeding	 is	 to	 look	 into	 natural	 language	approaches	that	already	exist	and	use	methods	such	as	domain	specific	thesaurally	derived	lexical	chains	and	text	case	based	reasoning	to	assess	similarity	of	documents	that	do	not	share	the	same	words	but	have	the	same	underlying	meaning.		
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Table 1. Similarity of Constitutional Sections, First Constitution-1907
State
Not Modified 
[Similarity=1]
Modified 
[Similarity<1 & >0 ]
Added 
[Similarity=0]
Deleted 
[Similarity=0]4.07% 11.92% 65.99% 18.02%[14] [41] [227] [62]89.02% 7.84% 3.14% 0%[227] [20] [8] [0]4.48% 20.63% 56.50% 18.39%[10] [46] [126] [41]0% 13.11% 83.61% 3.28%[0] [16] [102] [4]68.42% 20.30% 8.27% 3.01%[91] [27] [11] [4]79.21% 2.97% 16.83% 0.99%[80] [3] [17] [1]100% 0% 0% 0%[261] [0] [0] [0]47.46% 10.63% 34.12% 7.78%[683] [153] [491] [112]
*Number of sections in between brackets
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Figure 2. Evolution of Constitutional Topics, 1776−1907
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